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ABSTRACT
This contribution considers the emergence of litigation in the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as a common strategy
for various grassroots groups. It explores the legal status problems
of recognised non-Muslim minorities and belief groups in Turkey in
three different yet interlinked fields: the confiscated property of
minority foundations, the establishment of community associations
and the status of worship places. The analysis in this contribution
revolves around legal mobilisation in the ECtHR as a common
strategy for various religious groups, focusing on the grassroots
actors’ perceptions of their legal status problems and litigation in
the ECtHR and, in so doing, illuminating the grassroots level impact
of ECtHR case law on religious minority groups. By placing the
emphasis on an actor-centred approach to legal mobilisation, this
contribution builds on social mobilisation scholarship that
encourages a scrutiny of developments at the grassroots level in
view of offering an understanding of the indirect effects of the
Court’s decisions. Rather than solely analyse government-initiated,
central legal reform as a yardstick for the success or failure of a
court’s effects over a given country’s policies, this contribution
focuses on the indirect effects of the Court’s decisions and draws
attention to the much broader range of potential influence of court
decisions over the issues which those decisions address.
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Introduction: religious minority groups and their legal status problems
This contribution explores the legal status problems of religious minority groups in
Turkey1 and the impact of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court)
on the legal mobilisation of these groups. Specifically, the groups examined here include
Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Alevi, Turkish Protestant and Jehovah’s Witnesses (JWs) – all
groups which have litigated in the ECtHR regarding several issues related to their legal
status. A central problem in Turkish law regarding the legal status of religious commu-
nities is that religious/belief communities as such cannot register and obtain legal
personality. There is no clear law prohibiting these communities from having a legal
personality, nor one making such a registration possible. Moreover, the Turkish
Constitution does not mention any minorities in the country, and there are no laws
addressing minority issues specifically (Bayιr 2013). As a result, the legal status of
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minorities is a grey area in Turkish law, and several different governmental decrees
regulate minority institutions’ affairs instead of proper legal provisions (Kurban and
Hatemi 2009; Oran 2015; Yildirim 2017). Various aspects of the communal life of these
groups are hindered by their lack of legal personality. This contribution limits its focus to
the domain of three main legal status issues that these groups have litigated on in the
ECtHR: establishing community associations, opening and maintaining worship places,
and managing community properties.
The analysis in this contribution revolves around legal mobilisation in the ECtHR as a
common strategy for various religious groups. It focuses on grassroots actors’ percep-
tions of their legal status problems and litigation in the ECtHR and, in so doing,
illuminates the grassroots level impact of ECtHR case law on religious minority groups.
By placing the emphasis on an actor-centred approach to legal mobilisation, this
contribution builds on social mobilisation scholarship that encourages a scrutiny of
developments at the grassroots level for an understanding of the indirect effects of the
Court’s decisions (also see, Kurban et. al. 2008). Rather than solely analyse government-
initiated central legal reform as a yardstick for the success or failure of a court’s effects
over a given country’s policies, this contribution focuses on the indirect effects of Court
decisions and draws attention to the much broader range of potential influence of court
decisions over the issues which those decisions address.
Given this aforementioned limited protection by domestic legal frameworks, the
European Union (EU)-led reform period was welcomed by scholars engaging with matters
of religious freedom as an important step in the democratisation of the country. The
Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership, adopted at the Copenhagen EU Summit in
June 1993, included in their requirements for prospective EU-member states ‘the stability
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and
protection ofminorities’ (Göksel and Güneş 2005; Kubicek 2005; Öner 2014; Zihnioğlu 2013).
At the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, Turkey was awarded the status of a candidate for
EU membership. Meanwhile, specifically in relation to the ECtHR, already in 1987 Turkey
recognised the right to individual applications to the ECtHR, and in 1990 it accepted the
binding jurisdiction of the Court. Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution on the force of
international agreements was amended in 2004 so as to give the ECHR and the case law of
ECtHR direct effect and supremacy over national law. These EU accession process-related
reforms mainly include three series of Constitutional amendments and nine law packages
that amount to approximately 500 laws (Özbudun and Türkmen 2013).
That said, these legal reforms were not a panacea for the challenges faced by
religious minorities: problems remained in the implementation of legal reform, in the
reluctance of the government to extend freedoms to the Alevis and non-Muslim
minorities (Patton 2007; Yılmaz 2016) and in the national courts’ unwillingness to
accommodate the ECtHR’s rulings (Grigoriadis 2007; Özbudun 2007; Ulusoy 2011).
However, the process of democratisation and reform, and the negotiations for EU
membership have recently hit a major impasse. The political developments since
these efforts to reform the law in the first half of 2000s, in addition to other failures
of Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (the Justice and Development Party, AKP) in this now
stalled democratisation process, have contributed to the continuing legal conundrum
regarding the legal status of minorities and belief groups. As illuminated in the pages
that follow, attention to developments at the grassroots level reveals an altogether
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different dimension of progress made towards the establishment of legal status-
related rights of religious minority groups in Turkey, in spite of the stalled legal
reform and democratisation process observable from the top-down. Thus, an exclu-
sive focus on the Turkish state and the ECtHR as central actors in the story and on
legal reform and policy change as the most important outcomes of this process
would be, from the perspective set out in this contribution, an overly narrow
approach.
By placing the emphasis on an actor-centred approach to legal mobilisation, this
contribution aims to further scholarship on legal reform in Turkey. To understand the
dynamics of central legal reform, it emphasises the importance of grassroots-level legal
mobilisation strategies and goes beyond a policy-centred approach to legal reform in
order to appreciate the broader (and less conspicuous) impact of the ECtHR case law on
religious minorities in Turkey in terms of its indirect effects. To this end, this contribution
draws on scholarship which has long argued for a contextualisation of litigation within
broader social struggles (McCann 1994; NeJaime 2011; Vanhala 2015). NeJaime (2011,
953), for example, maintains that even litigation loss might produce positive indirect
effects since actors do not necessarily aim to win in the courts, but use litigation loss to
articulate rights-based demands, provide a public narrative and forge a group-based
identity. Olson (1981), moreover, argues that scholarship should focus on the indirect
effects of the litigation process, beyond a focus on winning and losing in the courts. Such
indirect effects include ways in which case law may influence social actors’ perceptions of
their rights, their discourse about their rights and their pursuit of those rights, whether
through political or legal means. As a recent contribution to this line of analysis, Vanhala
(2015) argues for taking domestic activists and the meanings they attribute to rights
seriously.
Drawing on this trend in social mobilisation theory, this present contribution seeks to
bring new light to grassroots strategies for legal mobilisation in the Turkish context and
in so doing demonstrates the ‘radiating effects’ (Galanter 1983) of the ECtHR decisions
on grassroots actors in the country. Focusing on what messages these decisions serve
beyond the limited circle of litigants, it argues that legal decisions do not necessarily just
affect grassroots actors by directing their rights claims towards formal court settings, but
also by influencing the nature and scope of their demands. This contribution aims to
nuance the ‘radiating effects’ theory by analysing how legal mobilisation at the ECtHR
level and subsequent government policies might both enable and limit further mobilisa-
tion by different grassroots actors. It also asks a critical question thus far neglected in the
relevant scholarship: what happens to grassroots strategies of legal mobilisation when
the implementation of the court decisions is limited and the political future for grass-
roots legal mobilisation is dim?
The main data for this study was collected through semi-formal interviews2 with
representatives of a broad range of religious minority groups, with lawyers handling
their religious freedoms cases and with scholars working on the legal status problems of
minorities and advising these groups in their cases to the ECtHR. The research under-
pinning this contribution also includes the analysis of relevant literature including
scholarly texts, government and civil society-generated reports, and newspaper articles
on the legal status of religious minorities in Turkey. Primary sources, such as legal
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instruments, judgements and administrative body decisions, have also been used to
help understand the historical, political and legal background.
The contribution begins with a discussion of the legal framework pertaining to
religious communities in Turkey and briefly explains the categories of recognised and
non-recognised minorities in the context of the Lausanne Treaty. The following section
traces the period of successful litigation in the ECtHR by the Greek Orthodox and
Armenian minorities in the late 1990s and early 2000s regarding the issue of acquiring
and maintaining community properties. The subsequent section explores a later period
that spans from 2002, when other minorities started to litigate in the Court, to 2016, the
date of the last ECtHR judgement at the time of writing. In the conclusion, the con-
tribution reflects on the strength of the indirect effects of ECtHR case law, particularly
when considered against the backdrop of the poor implementation records of the
Turkish state.
The legal framework pertaining to the right to freedom of religion or belief
in Turkey and EU-led legal reform
The Lausanne Peace Treaty of 19233 is the key legal text that establishes the minority
protection regime for Turkey’s non-Muslim communities. It continues to be a significant
legal instrument for the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief. The
Treaty identifies solely non-Muslim minorities as minority right holders (Meray 2003), yet
fails to specify the ‘non-Muslim minorities’ to which the Treaty applies. In practice, the
Turkish government extended the protection only to the Armenian (Apostolic, Protestant
and Catholic denominations), Greek Orthodox and Jewish communities.4 Turkey did not
include other non-Muslim groups, such as the Syriac Orthodox and Syriac Chaldean, and
Latin Catholics, in the Lausanne minority protection system. These groups remain with-
out formal legal recognition as religious faith groups. Also, the Turkish state does not
recognise other non-Muslim groups that became part of the country’s demographics
later, such as JWs or Turkish Protestants. Scholars have noted the problems associated
with this limited interpretation of the Lausanne Treaty, especially the lack of any
domestic framework for minority protection and the legal status of non-Muslim and non-
Sunni (i.e. Alevi) religious groups in the country (see, for example, Grigoriadis 2007; Oran
2015; Yildirim 2017).
However, a less noted problem is that, by a narrow adaptation of the Treaty’s terms,
the Turkish state reserves the right to limit the rights of collective representation of even
those minorities covered by the Lausanne Treaty. Meanwhile, there is no legal frame-
work that establishes the legal status of the religious and civil representatives of these
communities (Bebiroğlu 2008). Thus, for example, the Armenian Apostolic and Greek
Orthodox patriarchates have no legal standing in Turkey because the patriarchs of these
two religious groups do not have recognised rights specifically as representatives of
these groups. This fact creates two problems. First, there is no central religious authority
with legal status to manage all community institutions of these two groups. As
expressed in the US State Department 2011 Report on International Religious
Freedom, ‘since this recognition does not extend to religious leadership organs, the
administrations of these religious communities do not have legal personality’ (US
Department of State 2011, 3). Without legal personality, the religious heads of these
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communities do not have the authority to own, transfer or manage their respective
communities’ assets.
In relation to this first issue, all community property is owned and managed in
separate community foundations, known as ‘non-Muslim minority foundations’ (minority
foundations, hereafter) or vakifs. These are the only organs of Lausanne minorities with a
legal standing. Every community institution has a separate foundation, which is con-
trolled by individual boards that manage the property of their respective churches,
cemeteries, community schools and hospitals, and their respective endowed immovable
properties. The result is a rather fragmented management structure. Also, the legal
standing of these minority foundations has been limited through later governmental
decrees, court decisions and the discriminatory practices of the General Directorate of
Foundations (GDF), the governmental agency which regulates all charitable foundations
with a religious affiliation and assesses whether the foundations are operating within the
stated objectives of their organisational statute (as detailed in the following section). All
of the above has resulted in the loss of communal property for the Lausanne minorities,
and it is this loss which eventually led these groups to mobilise in the ECtHR.
The case of vakif properties: recognised minorities in the ECtHR
As it was briefly explained in the previous section, only the Lausanne minorities’
community foundations have proper legal status, however with serious limitations; the
latter are based mainly on discriminatory administrative and judicial practice.5 Despite
the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, over time, major laws and practices in violation of
the Treaty were introduced to exercise state control over the management and com-
munity property of these minorities. The 1926 Civil Code, while approving the establish-
ment of new foundations, excluded non-Muslim organisations by prohibiting
foundations ‘that support members of a certain race or community’.6 Most important
among these limiting governmental decrees was the 1935 Law on Foundations7 that
required all foundations to submit a property declaration by 1936. By and large the
foundations complied. But later, in the context of the Cyprus crisis with Greece,8 the
property declarations made by the foundations in 1936 were reinterpreted by the GDF
as the founding acts of these foundations.9 The legal effect of all acquisition of property
since 1936 was declared ‘null and void’ by the GDF, which argued that these declara-
tions did not mention the legal capacity to acquire ownership for the respective
foundations (Kurban and Hatemi 2009, 17). This paved the way for the seizure of
hundreds of properties by the GDF.
The right of the minority foundations to acquire property was further crippled by
restrictive legal practice. Especially two judgements of the Yargitay (Supreme Court of
Appeals) in 1971 and 1974 are important for our discussion here.10 In both of these
judgements, the Yargitay Court rejected the documents provided by a minority founda-
tion for the registration of immovables on the grounds that the community foundations
lacked legal personality (Bakar 2005, 263, 273).11 It based its decisions on the 1935 Law
on Foundations. This precedence later led to the reasoning in both the local and higher
courts that, unless a minority foundation’s founding deed permits the acquisition of
property, it could not acquire new property.12
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Specifically, the details of the 1974 case are especially important here since it set a
precedent and established subsequent jurisprudence in the national courts on the
properties of Lausanne minorities. In its 1974 decision, the Turkish Court of Cassation
not only upheld this policy but also declared minority foundations as ‘non-Turkish legal
persons’. The language of the ruling was quite revealing in itself: ‘legal entities estab-
lished by non-Turkish individuals are prohibited from acquiring immovables. Legal
entities are more powerful than natural persons, therefore the State may face certain
dangers […] if their right to acquire immovables is not restricted’.13
With this decision, an explicitly discriminatory legal categorisation was created that
established the status of non-Muslim minority citizens in the country as ‘foreigners’.
Those who had formed non-Muslim community foundations were thus subjected to
laws in the sphere of property rights that were applicable to foreigners. It was not until
2002 that the application of this discriminatory jurisprudence was made ineffective by
the adoption of Law No. 4771 in 2002, specifically, within the context of Turkey’s
accession process to the EU. This new law recognises explicitly the right of community
foundations to acquire new property.14
Within this national legal context of property loss, the ECtHR has been the main
venue for legal mobilisation by these groups to claim their rights. Their attempts to
litigate before the Court started in the early 1990s, shortly after the Turkish government
accepted the right of individuals to bring their human rights complaints directly to the
ECtHR. The first attempts were made at the initiative of the Armenian Patriarchate and
its lawyers, followed by cases from the Greek Orthodox Community.
The first win in the Court came only after the start of the EU reform process. Fener
Greek High School Foundation of the Greek Orthodox Community filed the first case
that was won by Turkish non-Muslim foundations in Strasbourg.15 The Court decided
that Turkey had violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR, which secures property
rights. The Court ordered Turkey to return the seized property to the foundation or to
pay an indemnity to the foundation’s management. The government executed the
decision by paying the specified indemnity, and the ruling created a precedent for
similar complaints pending before the ECtHR.
The second conviction of Turkey in Strasbourg came for a case filed by the Istanbul
Greek Patriarchate for the return of the Greek Orthodox children orphanage building in
2008. The case concerned the Büyükada, which the Patriarchate could not register under
its name due to the denial of legal personality to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate;
subsequently GDF took over the building.16
The third successful case in the ECtHR was a case by an Armenian foundation, the
Yedikule Hospital Foundation in 1999, concerning the confiscation by the Treasury of
two separate properties belonging to the foundation. What is especially important to
note in this case is that the government made an unexpected move by offering instead
to return the properties. Thus, this landmark outcome represented the first time that the
government returned to a non-Muslim foundation its confiscated properties, resulting in
a settlement on 26 June 2007.17 Later in the same year, another case by the same
foundation also resulted in a friendly settlement, whereby the government agreed to
return the disputed property.18 In 2008, the ECtHR further convicted Turkey in two
different cases filed on the same day by the Armenian foundations.19
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These successful cases in the ECtHR went hand in hand with legal reform adopted by
the AKP government in accordance with the EU accession process, especially the decree
in 2011 regarding minority foundations of the Lausanne minorities. The 2011 decree on
religious minority foundations stated that communities whose properties had been
expropriated by the state could apply for them to be returned and receive compensa-
tion for properties that had been sold to a third party by the GDF (2011 Report, 4).
Yet, legal reform was limited by the government’s cautious approach to property
rights and, especially, by its non-provision of legal and administrative regulations to
solve legal status problems for all religious minorities and belief groups in the country
and thus, in effect, a limited implementation of the 2011 decree on religious minority
foundations. Reflecting this limited approach, the state minister responsible for foun-
dations during the time of these ECtHR cases reacted to criticisms by the EU autho-
rities regarding the lack of a legal framework for religious freedoms in Turkey:
‘equating freedom of religion only with the restitution of properties makes me
uncomfortable. […] EU and the ECtHR are focusing on property’ (Radikal,
25 June 2005).
This quote relates to one reason why these minorities were reluctant to go to the
ECtHR in the first place. Notwithstanding the success of these early cases in the ECtHR,
rather than acting as a trigger for further mobilisation to exhaust national remedies and
reach Strasbourg, these first cases were marked by a clear fear by the minority repre-
sentatives that litigation in Strasbourg might further jeopardise these communities’
already precarious position in the wider Turkish society and especially vis- à-vis the
Turkish state.
Awareness of the government’s approach to property cases of recognised minorities
also led to the dropping of another early attempt by an Armenian minority foundation
to litigate in the Court; the board members changed their minds when the case was
ready to be taken to the ECtHR. A representative of a Greek Orthodox minority founda-
tion relayed that it was a particularly insistent lawyer for the case (a non-member of the
religious group) who made sure the case of the Fener Greek High School Foundation
regarding the confiscated properties would be seen to fruition at the ECtHR. This later
turned out to be the first successful case by a minority foundation from Turkey.
As noted at the outset, beyond attention to legal and political developments, also
critical to our understanding of the effects of ECtHR case law is insight into how this case
law is perceived and used (or not) by grassroots actors with a vested interest in the
issues at hand. Although these ECtHR cases were widely publicised as successes in the
Turkish media, not all parties involved in these cases focus on their victory in the Court.
Rather, the representatives of the Greek Orthodox and Armenian communities consulted
for this study all expressed criticism regarding the government’s non-implementation of
the ECtHR decisions and, in fact, its failure to come up with a legal reform on the status
of religious minorities.
Legal mobilisation slowed down and eventually ceased in the aftermath of reform.
This decline was regarded by one line of scholarship as a positive effect of ECtHR rulings
and the government’s willingness to initiate legal reform on the conditions of religious
minorities in the country (Özbudun and Türkmen 2013). However, my interlocutors
presented different perspectives on their successes in the Court and raised different
issues regarding the effects of the Court decisions on their further mobilisation. For
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example, from the viewpoint of one lawyer representing the Greek Orthodox
Patriarchate, there was a calculation by the state authorities when deciding to return
the confiscated properties and to pay compensation for the communities’ loss regarding
the cases in the ECtHR, based on the diminishing population size of these communities.
He argued that the government limited the reform on the properties of these minorities
and did not show incentive in dealing with the legal status of the patriarchates or civil
representative organs in order to ensure that ‘these communities are still not able to
sustain themselves’ and eventually be forced to sell the properties acquired via the
ECtHR.
His words bring a nuanced perspective on the success of Lausanne minorities in the
Court and point to the worries of the actors engaged in legal mobilisation about the
effects of ECtHR case law on the problems they are experiencing due to the remaining
vagueness of their legal status. Although they were able to reclaim their property in the
ECtHR, the limitedness of the reform process that followed and the continuation of these
minorities’ problems led the actors to question the effects of their victory in the Court.
Also, the view that the recognised minorities’ legal mobilisation ended after these
victories and the subsequent reform period does not give the full picture on the ground.
In fact, these communities continued legal mobilisation in domestic courts after the
2011 decree failed to provide a solution to their property cases, and currently there are
several property cases against the Court of Cassation regarding failure to return property
based on the decree. Several legal representatives of the minority foundations I inter-
viewed stressed the significance of legal mobilisation with a view to reaching the ECtHR
when domestic legal remedies, including legal reform by the government, fail to solve
their problems. In the estimations of one lawyer who follows property cases both in
domestic courts and in the ECtHR, based on the numbers of cases currently in the
process of exhausting domestic remedies, there will be tens of cases in the ECtHR in the
near future, as a second wave of legal mobilisation. Although they questioned the
ultimate effectiveness of the previous wave of mobilisation, these actors stated a clear
interest in mobilising before the ECtHR once again.
Legal mobilisation of non-recognised belief groups: Protestants and JWs
While the lack of legal status appeared as a problem of confiscation of minority proper-
ties for recognised minorities, in the case of non-recognised belief groups explored in
this section, the lack of legal status manifests itself mainly as a problem in establishing
community associations and opening and maintaining worship places.
Article 5 of the Law on Associations of 1983 unambiguously prohibited the establish-
ment of associations ‘based on certain religions or denominations or for the purpose of
acting on behalf of them’.20 Based on this law, non-Muslim religious groups were not
able to establish associations. A new Law on Associations was adopted in 200421 as part
of legal reform in the EU accession process. This new law ended the prohibition on
establishing associations based on certain religion or denomination. As a result, religious
groups started to establish their community associations to manage community affairs
and most importantly community property.
In this post-reform period, establishing associations emerged as an interim solution to
gain legal status, albeit limited. Yet, the association formula is not an adequate form of
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legal entity status for a belief community. Thus, religious groups still do not have legal
status as such even though now under the 2004 Law on Associations they can establish
community associations.
A related second problem these communities experience is impediments in establish-
ing and maintaining places of worship that are embedded in local municipality planning
regulations. Local municipalities often impose zoning regulations on churches, such as
minimum space requirements, that are not imposed on mosques. Municipalities often
deny approval to groups seeking to build churches on various grounds. There are also
cases in which a municipality granted this permission but local government officers,
such as a provincial governor, withheld approval (Yildirim 2013).
Starting with the early 2000s, the Turkish Protestant community22 and JWs23 turned
to legal mobilisation before the ECtHR as a strategy in their rights claims for legal status.
From that point in time, four cases filed by these two communities reached the ECtHR,
all concerning the right to freedom of association/assembly and the right to legally
organise and build places of worship:24 Tanyar and Küçükergin v. Turkey,25 Özbek and
Others v. Turkey26 and two cases joined in one decision in 2016, Yehova’nin Şahitlerini
Destekleme Derneği (Association for Support of Jehovah’s Witnesses) v. Turkey.27
In their mobilisation, JWs place a specific emphasis on the importance of getting
positive results in national courts. A representative for the JWs in Turkey stated that the
domestic litigation process takes a very long time, yet they ‘wait patiently until the end’
expecting domestic courts to rule in their favour since they claim it is of utmost
importance to ‘gain access to justice in the Turkish domestic courts’. However, several
court cases concerning JW associations (and those of Protestants, for that matter)
resulted in negative decisions in the national courts and eventually led to legal mobi-
lisation before the ECtHR.28
According to a 2016 report published by Turkish Protestants (Association of
Protestant Churches 2016), after legal reform and these successful ECtHR cases, JWs
have established 5 foundations in major cities and 3 branches of these foundations in
different locales, 34 church associations and over 30 branches representing these
associations. However, the remaining congregations that were not able to establish
foundations still do not possess any legal personality. Due to this lack of legal status
for worship places, group members who assemble in these premises still run the risk of
prosecution by police.
The lack of full implementation of ECtHR decisions by the government and limitations
of legal reform lead to a concern among these groups to reconsider their success in the
Court. A representative of a Protestant church stated that legal mobilisation for the right
to establish associations was necessary yet limited:
We are trying to solve our legal status problems via associations; yet associations are not
accepted as churches or religious organisations. An association is an NGO. It is a non-profit
organisation for people to get together around specific aims. What we actually need is a law
of religious institutions, or something regulating and legalising the affairs to religious com-
munities. We need a legal structure to include us too. It should be a system that allows for
flexibility, goes beyond accepted religious practices [i.e., Sunni-Islam practices]. I do not know
how it will happen; I admit that the current legal arrangements regarding associations gave us
a certain amount of breathing space, but it is not the ideal, desired solution to our problems.
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From this representative’s perspective, then, the victory in the Court regarding the right
to establish associations was not enough to solve the legal status problems of these
communities fully; it was just a limited solution.
Alevi cases in the ECtHR: one step forward?
The largest non-recognised religious group in Turkey is Alevis. This group is rather
exceptional for our discussion here since they are not a non-Muslim community like
the other groups included in this contribution.29 Alevi worship places, cem houses
(cemevis), have no legal status as places of worship. Further, they receive no funding
from the state, contrary to the official Sunni mosques. The budget of the Presidency of
Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı or the Diyanet) was reserved for the majority
Sunni community, covering the salaries of imams and other costs (Gözaydın 2009). Alevi
legal mobilisation regarding the legal status of their community organisations thus
centred around two main issues: the status of worship places and the discriminatory
services of the Diyanet. Alevi groups, brought together in a federation entitled Alevi
Vakıfları Federasyonu (Federation of Alevi Foundations), have publicly expressed a
number of grievances vis-à-vis the state. A report prepared by the Federation claimed
that its member Alevi groups often face obstacles regarding cem houses (Alevi Vakıfları
Federasyonu 2011). According to the report, there was also bias in the Diyanet, which
did not allocate specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership.
It is important to note that, unlike the other groups discussed in this text, Alevis have
tended to mobilise legally whilst simultaneously pursuing other strategies, such as
formal meetings with government officials. Litigation before the ECtHR specifically
emerged after their demands, presented to legal and administrative authorities, proved
ineffective.30 More precisely, Alevis aimed to reach the ECtHR in the aftermath of ‘the
Alevi workshops’. These meetings were formal gatherings with government officials on
several problems faced by the Alevi community (Özkul 2015; Soner and Toktaş 2011). As
these workshops fell short of providing Alevis with the same social, political and legal
status as Sunni citizens, Alevis started to focus on legal mobilisation in the ECtHR. The
first Alevi case on legal status in the ECtHR, Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi (Cem)
Vakfı v Turkey, concerned the lack of recognition for Alevi worship places (cemevis).
Based on the problems of operating cemevis, the Foundation argued that, under Turkish
law, Alevi places of worship should be granted an exemption from paying electricity
bills. Relying in particular on Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken together
with Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion), Cem Foundation
complained that, although the electricity bills for Sunni places of worship (mosques)
were paid by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, Alevi worship places had been deprived
of this privilege on account of the failure to be recognised as places of worship in
Turkey. In its judgement,31 the Court confirmed that there had been a violation of Article
14 taken together with Article 9, in that the system for granting exemptions from
payment of electricity bills for places of worship under Turkish law entailed discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion.
When talking about the Alevis’ success in Cem Foundation case, a lawyer of the
Foundation stated that their legal mobilisation on worship places in the ECtHR proble-
matised for the first time the discriminatory practices of a state institution, i.e. the
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Diyanet. According to him, this strategy enhanced the effects of the Court’s decision and
also affected other minority groups, including the Lausanne minorities:
Lausanne minorities for example went to ECtHR too, but for ‘individual’ cases, such as the
properties of their foundations. Issues concerning other religious minority groups were not
addressed. Only after we took cemevi cases to the ECtHR, did the government start to pay
the [Lausanne minority] churches’ electricity bills.
However, the above claim of widening the effects of the ECtHR towards other minorities
was not shared by other Alevi actors. The need to broaden the scope of litigation was a
common topic in some of the interviews I conducted. For example, a representative of
the Alevi-Bektasi Federation, an umbrella organisation for individual Alevi associations,
stated that the Cem Vakfi case on the status of the Alevi worship places was just a
starting point in their legal mobilisation:
If we can elevate the Alevi struggle to a higher level, then we will start getting results.
Otherwise, now that the state will pay electricity fees after the successful ECtHR cases, it will
start paying the Alevi clergymen’s (dede) salary eventually. This way they will solve immedi-
ate problems, they can close the issue, and Alevis might stay silent on the issue. In this new
period, we have reached a certain stage in our struggle towards successful cases in the
ECtHR, now we need to forward it by making sure they are enforced.
This representative’s concerns about the government’s aims to limit the issue with
electricity bills and clergymen’s salaries point to the effects of successful ECtHR cases.
The government’s limited approach to Alevi issues during the reform process and the
continuation of Alevi issues during and after the legal reform period have led to a
reconsideration of the effects of a win in the Court.
The representative’s question of what this new stage entails was showcased by
a second case in the Court, Doğan and Others v Turkey, in which Cem Vakfi won a
favourable decision from ECtHR’s Grand Chamber.32 This time, at the centre of the
claimants’ argument was the Diyanet and the claim that it provides services exclusively
to the Sunni majority, thus denying public religious services to Alevis. The applicants
maintained that this refusal implied an assessment of their faith on the part of the national
authorities and was in breach of the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality with regard
to religious beliefs. Going further than their demands in Cem Vakfi v. Turkey regarding the
recognition of Alevi places of worship (cemevis), the applicants stated in their demands to
the Court vis-à-vis the state that they request that: ‘services connected with the practice of
the Alevi faith constitute a public service, Alevi religious leaders be recruited as civil
servants, and special provision be made in the budget for the practice of the Alevi faith’
(Doğan and Others v. Turkey).
This second case is the first in the Court to question the discriminatory policies of a
state institution, the Diyanet, against religious minority groups. It is also an indicator that
Alevi legal mobilisation has multiple layers in its strategies approaching the issue of legal
status. The cases they took to the Court represented several facets of the issues they are
experiencing regarding the discriminatory practices against their organisations and
worship places. The Doğan case broadened the scope of their demands and was
aimed to address the discriminatory policies that the previous victory in the Court was
not enough to remedy again in the Court. Once again, legal mobilisation with a view to
reaching the ECtHR emerged as a viable strategy for the actors, when domestic legal
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remedies, including legal reform by the government, failed to solve their problems of
religious minority communities.
In lieu of a conclusion: the impact of ECtHR case law and a way forward
This contribution discussed the effects of ECtHR case law on legal mobilisation of
grassroots actors through a discussion of the major groups which litigated before the
Court regarding their legal status and related problems. Against the danger of equalising
all these groups under one category of religious minorities litigating in the ECtHR, this
contribution engaged with their perspectives and their differences on issues regarding
legal status in order to offer nuances to accounts of the impact of the ECtHR on religious
minority rights. These accounts generally focus on legal reform and on state implemen-
tation, or non-implementation, of ECtHR case law as the effects of the Court’s case law.
This top-down focus misses crucial evidence of other impacts of ECtHR case law, such as
how litigants process their win in the court, how they perceive the government’s
implementation or non-implementation of these judgements and whether they con-
tinue to mobilise in the ECtHR. Based on empirical research conducted with grassroots-
level actors, this contribution tried to understand how ECtHR case law takes a life of its
own at the grassroots level. A top-down perspective allows us to analyse the ECtHR’s
impact in terms of legal reform or makes a case on its failure because of unimplemented
decisions by a scrutiny of judicial and administrative practices. A look at the grassroots-
level developments unlocks a world wherein each Court case, filed by different religious
groups, has a significant impact on the litigating religious groups themselves, on their
claims and on their perceptions of and discourse about their rights.
In trying to make sense of the patterns of grassroots mobilisation, we can argue that
it can be attributed to the positive results of the recognised minority’s property cases in
front of the ECtHR. However, if we only emphasise the effects of these first cases on
further mobilisation, we would be ignoring the voices represented in this contribution.
Several actors expressed insights about how ECtHR case law influenced their way of
thinking about their own problems, the government’s approach to these problems and
the effects of success in the Court. In some cases, ECtHR case law resulted in a critical
perspective on government-initiated legal reform in the EU accession process, yet in
others it discouraged litigation on particular topics.
Furthermore, the radiating effects of ECtHR judgements on the recognised and non-
recognised minorities’ legal mobilisation in Turkey exist alongside other important
factors that led to the mobilisation of these groups in the ECtHR: the limits of the
minority protection system in the country, the shortcomings in the implementation of
ECtHR decisions by the government and the failures of the government to deliver in its
reform process. The preference for legal mobilisation in the ECtHR resonance in a
discriminatory legal practice that does not accept non-Muslim, non-Sunni or non-
Turkish groups as ‘proper’ Turkish citizens (Erdemir 2005; Erman and Göker. 2000).
Even after legal reform, many issues regarding the legal status of these religious
communities have led actors to litigate in the ECtHR. Also, the limited implementation
of the Court’s decisions by the Turkish government in the eyes of the grassroots actors
has also led these actors to see the Court as limited in its power to influence Turkish
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policymakers. As the representative of JWs put it on the limits of their success in the
Court:
Yet, we truly wish that the government recognised our places of worship. Right now, [our
worship places are] de facto recognised, but legally, officially they are still not allowed. What
does it mean? ‘You are in my palm. If I close it, you will get stuck.’ I do not want to live with
this fear. […] I do not want to use these places in fear. Today it is open, tomorrow it might
be closed down. I do not even know what will happen. I do not want it to be in such an
uncertain situation.
Thus, none of these groups expressed full trust to the ECtHR’s effects on the Turkish
legal system. In their accounts of the aftermaths of these cases, they all expressed
concern for the limited solutions that these cases brought to their communal lives
and the uncertain future of their communities’ various legal status problems. Legal
reform did not completely solve the confusion over legal status nor did it end the
discriminatory practices against religious communities. For some actors in the field the
fact that successful mobilisation in the ECtHR could not solve these communities’
problems points to a vicious circle of success in the court. As communities continue
to litigate on the immediate problems they experience, such as the status of worship
places or the right to establish associations and reach positive results in the Court, they
avoid mobilising around issues that are at the root of Turkey’s discriminatory regime,
including the existence of the Diyanet or the practices of the GDF.
In the context of the current political situation in Turkey, many questions remain
unanswered and should be the topic of further research: how can we understand the
indirect effects of the Court on the legal mobilisation of grassroots actors when the
underlying reasons of the problems they are experiencing are so fragmentary, the
government response is limited and further mobilisation under the current political
situation is difficult, if not altogether impossible? Certainly, the Doğan and Others case
in the Court was an attempt by the Alevis in this direction. As Turkey is going through
precarious times, the indirect and long-term effects of the ECtHR’s most recent decision
remain to be seen.
Notes
1. The terminology I am using here requires clarification since there is a distinction between
minorities and belief groups in the literature on minorities in Turkey. As explained in the
following section, not all religious groups are recognised in Turkey. The term ‘minority’ is
only used for those non-Muslim groups that are recognised by the Turkish state based on
the Treaty of Lausanne, i.e. Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish. In this context, ‘minority’
also refers to groups that are not only belief communities but also ethnically different from
the Turkish majority. Thus, the term ‘minority’ refers to this dual marker of difference:
religion and ethnicity. The only exception is the Syriacs who are also referred to as a
minority (Süryani azinlik) although this community was not recognised by the Turkish state
as a Lausanne Treaty minority. The latter is because Syriacs are also both ethnically and
religiously different and have similar roots in the historical land now called Turkey with that
of the recognised minorities. The remaining belief communities under scrutiny here,
Turkish Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses, are mostly categorised as belief groups
(inanç gruplari) since they are not recognised by the state as ‘minorities’. Alevis, on the
other hand, establish a third category and they are mainly referred as a ‘belief community’
(Alevi inanc toplumu), not as a recognised minority, yet not a new community like belief
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groups. They also form a separate category since, unlike other religious minorities dis-
cussed in this contribution, they are not non-Muslim, but non-Sunni. For purposes of clarity,
in this contribution I will be using ‘religious community’ to refer to all these groups as an
umbrella term, but I urge the readers to be aware of these differences.
2. This contribution draws on research conducted under the auspices of the European
Research Council-funded Grassrootsmobilise Research Programme (www.grassrootsmobi
lise.eu, GA no. 338463). The Turkish case study in this project entails 47 such interviews.
3. The Lausanne Peace Treaty was ratified in domestic law by Law No. 340 and is thus part of
national law.
4. In fact, these names were not explicitly mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty. Özbudun (2007)
argues that this was due to the insistence of the Turkish government at that time.
5. For studies that discusses the issue of non-Muslim community foundations in greater detail,
see Kurban and Hatemi (2009), Null and Void (2016) and Yildirim (2017).
6. Civil Code, art.74 (2) (1926), Resmî Gazete (Official Gazette), No. 339 (4 April 1926).
7. Law for Foundations No. 2762, Resmî Gazete (Official Gazette), No. 3027 (13 June 1935).
8. For the effects of the Cyprus crisis on the non-Muslim minority foundations in Turkey, see
Kurban and Tsitselikis (2010).
9. Yildirim (2017) states that the GDF requested the community foundations to submit their
founding deeds in order to prove their ownership of non-movables in their disposal and
aware that they did not have any founding deeds.
10. General Board of the Court of Cassation, Decision No. E. 1971/2-820, K. 1974/505
(8 May 1974).
11. The Court of Appeals 2nd Chamber, 6 July 1971, E4449, K4399.
12. Judgement of the Yargitay, 8 May 1974, E971/2–8420 and K974/505.
13. Cited in Özbudun and Türkmen (2013, 994).
14. Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun [Law on the Amendment on Various
Laws] No.4771, 03.08.2002, R.G. No. 24841, 09.08.2002.
15. Fener Greek High School Foundation v. Turkey (Application no. 34478/97, Judgement,
Strasbourg, 9 January 2007).
16. ‘ECLJ welcomes the ECHR decision in the Christian orphanage case v. Turkey’, ECLJ, https://
eclj.org/eclj-welcomes-the-echr-decision-in-the-christian-orphanage-case-v-turkey (last
accessed 17 August 2017). ECtHR (2008) Fener Greek Patriarchate (Ecumenical Patriarchate)
v. Turkey. No. 14340/05, 8 July.
17. ECtHR, Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Ermeni Hastanesi Vakfı v. Turkey, Application No. 50147/99 and
51207/99, 26 June 2007 (friendly settlement). The Court joined the two separate applica-
tions that the applicant, an Armenian hospital foundation, had filed on 16 July and
20 August 1999.
18. ECtHR, Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Ermeni Hastanesi Vakfı v Turkey, Application No: 31441–02,
4 December 2007 (friendly settlement).
19. ECtHR (2008) Yedikule Armenian Surp Pırgiç Hospital Foundation v. Turkey. No. 36165/02,
16 December; ECtHR (2008) Board of Trustees of the Samatya Surp Kevork Armenian Church,
School and Cemetery v. Turkey. No. 1480/03, 16 December.
20. Law on Associations No. 2908, O.G. No. 18184 07.10.1983.
21. Law on Associations No. 5253, 04.11.2004.
22. Turkish Protestants have around 3500 members and approximately 140 church congrega-
tions of various sizes, mainly in three big cities of the country, İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir
(Association of Protestant Churches 2010).
23. According to the website of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Turkey, they have 2829 members and a
total of 38 congregations. https://www.jw.org/en/news/legal/by-region/turkey/ (last
accessed 18 October 2017).
24. One more case by Seventh Day Adventists, an unrecognised non-Muslim religious group
that this contribution does not cover, reached the ECtHR on the topic of legal status of
religious associations. Altınkaynak and Others v. Turkey. 12541/06 (communicated
20 January 2011).
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25. Tanyar and Küçükergin v. Turkey (application no 74242/01) (judgement 5 December 2006).
26. Özbek and Others v. Turkey (application no. 35570/02) (judgement 6 October 2009).
27. Association for Solidarity with Jehovah Witnesses and Others v. Turkey (applications nos.
36915/10 and 8606/13) (judgement 24 May 2016).
28. For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Yildirim (2017).
29. An account of the exclusion of Alevis from the Turkish citizenship regime on the basis of
their non-Sunni belief is beyond the scope of this contribution. For a discussion of different
Alevi perspectives on Turkish secularism and religious belief, see Dressler (2011). Alevi legal
mobilisation in the ECtHR is partly about this issue of equal citizenship – such as the
mention of religious affiliation on ID cards and exemption from religious education classes
(Açikel and Ates 2011; Erdemir 2005; Erman and Göker. 2000).
30. ECtHR had received two more Alevi cases in the past: one brought by the parents of an
Alevi child against compulsory religious education and the other concerning the removal of
religious affiliation from Turkish ID cards.
31. Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi (Cem) Vakfı v. Turkey (application no. 32093/10)
(Judgement 2 December 2014).
32. İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey (application No. 62649/10) (Judgement 26 April 2016).
The Grand Chamber of the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 9 ECHR and
Article 14.
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